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Price Level in the  United States 
Robert  J. Barro 
University  of Rochester 
Earlier analysis of unanticipated money growth is extended  to output 
(GNP)  and the price level  (GNP deflator) for recent U.S.  experience. 
Price level determination is more complicated than output determination, 
because both anticipated and unanticipated money movements are in- 
volved.  Empirical  results accord well  with  the  model-notably,  they 
support the key hypothesis of a one-to-one,  contemporaneous link be- 
tween anticipated money and the price level. Precise estimates are ob- 
tained for the lagged responses of output  and prices to unanticipated 
money movements. Cross-equation comparisons indicate that the price 
response to unanticipated money movements has a longer lag than the 
output  response. A form of lagged adjustment in money demand  can 
account for this difference. The forecasts for inflation average 5.5 percent 
per year for 1977-80. 
In  an  earlier  empirical  study  (Barro  1977a),  I  discussed  the  concept  of 
unanticipated  money  growth  and  the hypothesis  that  only  this component 
of monetary  change  would  influence  real variables  like the unemployment 
rate.  The  present  study  applies  the  analysis  to  output  and  extends  the 
framework  to  a  consideration  of  the  price  level  and  hence  to  the  rate  of 
inflation.  The  nature  of the  monetary  influence  on  the  price  level  is more 
complicated  than  that  for output  or the unemployment  rate,  because  both 
anticipated  and  unanticipated  movements  in  money  must  be  taken  into 
This work is part of a project on  money,  expectations,  and economic  activity  that is 
being  supported  by  the  National  Science  Foundation.  The  present  research was  com- 
pleted while  I was a national fellow at the Hoover  Institution.  Portions of this paper will 
be included in a study of inflation by the U.S.  Treasury. I have benefited from comments 
by Takeshi  Amemiya,  Paul  Evans,  Herschel  Grossman, Bob Hall,  Bronwyn  Hall,  Leo- 
nardo Leiderman,  Bob Lucas, Ben McCallum,  Franco Modigliani,  and Hal  White. 
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account.  In  fact  a  key  hypothesis  to  be  tested  is  that  anticipated  move- 
ments  in the  money  stock  (with  expected  rate of inflation-type  effects  held 
fixed)  would  be  reflected  in  one-to-one,  contemporaneous  movements  of 
the  price  level. 
This  paper  reports  empirical  results  on  the  relation  of money  to output 
(real GNP)  and the price level  (the GNP  deflator)  for the post-World  War 
II  period  in  the  United  States.  The  results  for output  are  basically  satis- 
factory  and  resemble  the  earlier  findings  for unemployment.  The  results 
for the  price  level  also accord  well  with  the underlying  model-in  particu- 
lar,  the  hypothesis  of a one-to-one,  contemporaneous  link  between  antici- 
pated  money  and  the  price  level  is supported  by  the  empirical  evidence. 
The  results  also  provide  precise  estimates  of  the  lagged  response  of  the 
price  level  and  the  rate  of inflation  to  unanticipated  money  movements. 
Substantial  space  is devoted  to a cross-equation  comparison  of the  output 
and price level  responses  to monetary  movements.  The  price level  response 
appears  to be drawn  out  relative  to the output  response.  However,  the two 
patterns  can  be  reconciled  by  a form  of lagged  adjustment  in the  money- 
demand  function. 
The  first  part  of  the  paper  deals  with  the  money-growth  process,  the 
second  part  with  output,  and  the  third  part  with  the  price  level.  Part  IV 
discusses  predictions  for  1977 onward,  while  Part  V  combines  the various 
pieces  of the analysis  to simulate  a dynamic  "Phillips  curve."  The  last part 
discusses  some  promising  extensions  of the  research. 
I.  Money-Growth  Equation 
The  money-growth  equation,  which  is  used  to  divide  observed  money 
growth  into  anticipated  and  unanticipated  components,  corresponds  in 
form  to  the  expression  that  was  used  in  my  earlier  analysis  (Barro  1977a, 
pp.  101-5).  In  this  formulation  the  money-growth  rate  is  related  to  a 
measure  of  federal  government  expenditure  relative  to  normal  (which 
captures  an  aspect  of  the  revenue  motive  for  money  creation),  a  lagged 
measure  of the unemployment  rate  (which  reflects countercyclical  response 
of money  growth),  and  two  annual  lagged  values  of money  growth  (which 
pick  up  persistence  effects  not  captured  by  the  other  explanatory  vari- 
ables).  Aside  from an extension  of the sample  to 1976, the only  change  from 
the  previous  setup  is  that  the  estimation  now  weighs  the  World  War  II 
observations  less heavily  than  the postwar  values.  This  differential  weight- 
ing  is  appropriate  because  of  the  larger  error  variance  that  apparently 
prevailed  during  the  war.  Each  variable  observation  from  1941  to  1945  is 
multiplied  by 0.36-a  value  that was determined  iteratively  along  with  the 
estimation  of  the  money-growth  equation  from  a  maximum  likelihood 
criterion.  Each  observation  from  1946 to  1976 receives  a unit  weight  in the 
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Using  annual  observations  from  1941  to  1976,  the  estimated  money- 
growth  equation  is, with  standard  errors in  parentheses, 
DMt  = 
0.082 +  0.41DMt-1  +  0.21DMt-2  +  0.072FEDVt +  0.026UN,_1, 
(0.027)  (0.14)  (0.12)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (1) 
R2  (weighted)  =  0.77,  D-W  =  1.9,  a  =  0.015, 
where  D-W  is  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic,  a  is  the  standard  error  of 
estimate  (applying  to  the  error  term  for the  post-World  War  II  period), 
M  is  an  annual  average  of  the  Ml  definition  of  the  money  stock,  and 
DMt  _  log  (M,)  -  log  (M, -1)  is  the  annual  average  growth  rate  of 
money.  The  variable  FEDV,  -log  (FED,)  -  [log  (FED)]*  measures 
federal  expenditure  relative  to  "normal,"  where  FEDt  is  current  real 
expenditure  and  [log  (FED)]*  is an exponentially  decliningdistributed  lag 
of current  and  past  values  of log  (FED),  using  an  adaptation  coefficient 
of  0.2  per  year  (as  discussed  in  Barro  1977a,  p.  103).  The  variable 
UN  log  (U/l  -  U)  is a cyclical  variable,  where  Uis  the unemployment 
rate  in  the  total  labor  force. 
The  main  difference  between  the  present  estimates  and  the earlier  ones 
appears  in the estimated  coefficients  of the lagged  money-growth  variables, 
DMt-1  and  DM,-2,  which  are  now  0.41,  0.21,  as  compared  with  the 
previous  estimates,  0.24,  0.35.  The  suggestion  of negative  serial correlation 
of the  residuals  in the  earlier  equation,  for which  the  estimate  of the  first- 
order  serial  correlation  coefficient  was  -.35,  is  absent  in  the  present 
results  (see n.  1). These  differences  stem from the lower  weight  that  is now 
attached  to  the  World  War  II  observations. 
The  estimated  values  from  equation  (1),  DM{,  and  the  residuals, 
DMR~t  -DM,  -  ff-71t,  are used to measure,  respectively,  the anticipated 
and  unanticipated  components  of money  growth.  This  concept  of antici- 
pated  money  growth  is  discussed  in  the  earlier  study  (pp.  105-6).  The 
estimated  values,  DM  and DMR,  are indicated  along  with  values  of actual 
money  growth  in  table  1, columns  1-3. 
II.  Output  Equation 
The  form of the  equation  for output  (real GNP)  is similar  to that  specified 
for the unemployment  rate in my earlier  work.  The  hypothesis  that  money 
growth  influences  output  only  when  this  growth  is unanticipated  implies 
that  current  and  lagged  values  of  DMR  enter  the  output  equation,  but 
current  and  lagged  values  of  actual  money  growth,  DM,  are  excluded. 
I The  value  of  the  Durbin  h-statistic,  which  is  more  appropriate  in  a  model  with  a 
lagged  dependent  variable  (see,  e.g.,  Maddala  1977,  p.  372),  is  0.6,  which  differs  in- 
significantly  from  zero. TABLE  1 
VALUES  OF  MONEY  GROWTH  AND  OUTPUT 
DM  nY  DMR  log  (y)  log (y)  log(y)  - 
log(y) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1941  .160  .171  -.011  ...  ...  ... 
1942  .179  .207  -.028  ...  ...  ... 
1943  .265  .202  .063  ...  ...  ... 
1944  .162  .207  -  .045  ... 
1945  .150  .148  .003  ..  ...  ... 
1946  .068  .066  .002  .033  .027  .006 
1947  .047  .036  .011  -.022  -.022  .001 
1948  .004  .017  -.013  -.016  -.018  .002 
1949  -.010  .007  -.017  -.046  -.033  -.012 
1950  .026  .003  .023  .003  -  .005  .007 
1951  .044  .029  .015  .045  .050  -.006 
1952  .049  .038  .012  .047  .062  -  .015 
1953  .024  .041  -.016  .049  .035  .014 
1954  .015  .020  -.004  .001  .008  -  .007 
1955  .031  .024  .007  .030  .016  .015 
1956  .012  .023  -.011  .016  .005  .012 
1957  .005  .018  -.013  -.001  -.013  .011 
1958  .012  .016  -.004  -  .039  -  .014  -  .025 
1959  .037  .028  .008  -  .016  .004  -.019 
1960  -  .001  .033  -.033  -  .029  -  .023  -  .006 
1961  .021  .025  -.005  -.039  -.036  -.004 
1962  .022  .034  -.012  -.018  -  .020  .002 
1963  .029  .031  -.002  -.015  -.019  .005 
1964  .039  .034  .005  .001  .004  -  .003 
1965  .042  .037  .004  .023  .013  .009 
1966  .044  .041  .003  .045  .022  .024 
1967  .039  .041  -.003  .037  .019  .017 
1968  .068  .039  .029  .044  .045  -  .001 
1969  .061  .044  .017  .034  .066  -  .032 
1970  .038  .046  -  .008  -  .005  -  .009  .004 
1971  .065  .044  .021  -.010  -.006  -.005 
1972  .068  .057  .012  .010  .006  .004 
1973  .072  .061  .011  .028  .000  .028 
1974  .053  .059  -.006  -.025  -.015  -.010 
1975  .042  .059  -.017  -.079  -.050  -.029 
1976  .049  .061  -.012  -.054  -.065  .011 
A  B 
1977  .058  -.056  -.061 
1978  .067  -.042  -.046 
1979  .068  -.035  -.037 
1980  .068  -.032  -.034 
0  . . . . . . . .  .070  -.032  -.034 
NOTE.-DMt  log  (Mt)  -  log  (Mt  -),  where  M  is  an  annual  average  of  Ml  from  recent  issues  of  the 
Federal Reserve  Bulletin, incorporating  the  revision  of data  from  the  February  1976  issues.  DM  is the estimated 
value  from  eq.  (1).  Predicted  values  for 1977 and  later years use the  1976 value  of FED  V (0.18).  DMR  _  DM 
-  DM.  y  is  real  GNP  in  1972  dollars  (U.S.  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  1977,  p.  188).  For  1946-76, 
log  (yt)  -log  (yt)  -  2.985  -  0.0354-t  is output  relative  to trend  based  on the estimated  constant  (2.953  + 
0.549(  ,  where  AMIL =  0.0585  is the  mean  value  of  the  military  variable  over  the  1946-76  period)  and 
time  trend  in  eq.  (3).  Log  (y) from  1946 to 76 is the estimated  value  based  on eq.  (3).  From  1977 on,  predicted 
values  labeled  A are based  on the estimated  output  eq.  (3).  Values  labeled  B are based on the jointly  estimated 
coefficients  shown  in  eq.  (13).  Output  predictions  assume  that  MIL  =  DMR  =  0 from  1977  on. 
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Empirically, the contemporaneous and three annual lag values of DMR 
turn out  to  be  important for explaining  output.  The  persisting output 
effect of monetary shocks implied by the inclusion of lagged values of the 
DMR  variable can  be rationalized from the impact  of shocks on stock 
variables, such as stocks of productive capital  (Lucas  1975), which are 
carried forward into future periods. An  analogous argument, based on 
adjustment costs for changes in labor input, is developed in Sargent (1977). 
In  addition  to  monetary influences, the  output  equation  includes  a 
time-trend  variable-intended  to  capture  the  secular  movement  of 
"normal" output  and  the military-personnel (draft-pressure) variable, 
MIL  (tabulated in table 2),  that was included in my previous study of 
unemployment.2  In  that  study  (pp.  106-7)  the  military variable  was 
viewed as measuring the incentive, operating through differential proba- 
bilities  of  being  conscripted into  the  military,  for avoiding  the  status 
"unemployed." For example, the incentive to stay in school or to take a 
job rather than be unemployed was viewed as a response to the military 
draft-partly  reflected  in  reduced  labor-force participation  rates  and 
partly  in  higher  employment  rates of  labor-market participants-that 
would  show  up  as  a  corresponding reduction in  unemployment  rates. 
Subsequent analysis that I have carried out on unemployment rates strati- 
fied by sex and age  (to be reported) indicates that the response to the 
military variable is concentrated in younger males, which supports the 
interpretation of this variable as a draft-pressure effect on labor supply 
rather than an aggregate demand effect. With respect to output, the mili- 
tary variable would  be expected  to operate positively only through the 
induced employment response, since the effects that involve a disincentive 
to labor-force participation would operate inversely on output.3  Hence 
the  argument  for  including  the  military  variable  as  an  expansionary 
element  is less persuasive in the case of output  than in the case of the 
unemployment rate. 
The form of the output equation is 
log  (yt)  =  ao  +  a1DMR,  +  a2DMR,-1  +  a3DMR,-2  +  a4DMR,-3 
+  a5MIL,  +  a6t +  UV,  (2) 
where y  is real GNP in  1972 dollars and ut is a stochastic term with the 
usual properties. 
2  A contemporaneous or lagged value of a terms-of-trade variable is insignificant when 
added to the output  equation.  The  MIL variable is defined as the ratio of military per- 
sonnel  to  the  male  population  aged  15-44  for years in  which  a  selective  draft was  in 
operation. The variable takes on a zero value at other times (parts of 1947-48  and  1970- 
76). See n. 4 below on the effect of removing the distinction between years that do and do 
not have  a selective  draft. A minimum-wage-rate  variable,  which  appeared  in my pre- 
vious  analysis  of  unemployment,  is  insignificant  when  added  to  the  output  equation. 
3  To  the  extent  that  draftees  receive  lower  wages  than  they  would  in  alternative 
civilian occupations,  there would be an additional negative effect of the military variable 
on measured GNP. TABLE 2 
VALUES  OF THE  PRICE  LEVEL,  INFLATION  RATE,  AND  OTHER  VARIABLES 
log  (P)  - 
log (P)  log  ()  lo:g (-P)  DP  DP  T  Gy  MIL 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1945...  -.968  -.545  -.422  .024  ...  .026  .416  .350 
1946...  -.823  -.636  -.189  .145  ...  .025  .122  .105 
1947...  -.699  -.626  -.073  .125  ...  .026  .077  .012  (.048) 
1948...  -.633  -.632  -.001  .066  .068  .028  .087  .022  (.044) 
1949...  -.642  -.626  -.016  -.010  .007  .027  .100  .048 
1950...  -.624  -.627  .003  .019  .016  .026  .088  .049 
1951 ...  -.557  -.573  .016  .066  .050  .029  .141  .092 
1952...  -.545  -.546  .001  .012  .011  .030  .179  .106 
1953...  -.529  -.523  -.006  .015  .022  .032  .184  .105 
1954...  -.516  -.524  .009  .013  .005  .029  .155  .099 
1955 ...  -.494  -.491  -.004  .022  .025  .031  .133  .090 
1956...  -.464  -.463  .000  .031  .031  .034  .128  .083 
1957...  -.431  -.434  .003  .033  .030  .039  .132  .081 
1958 ...  -.414  -.419  .005  .017  .012  .038  .137  .075 
1959...  -.393  -.383  -.010  .021  .031  .044  .127  .073 
1960...  -.375  -.387  .012  .017  .006  .044  .123  .071 
1961..  .  -.367  -.364  -.003  .009  .012  .044  .127  .071 
1962 ...  -.348  -.337  -.011  .018  .030  .043  .129  .077 
1963...  -.334  -.328  -.006  .014  .020  .043  .123  .073 
1964 ...  -.319  -.318  .000  .015  .016  .044  .115  .072 
1965 ...  -.297  -.312  .015  .022  .007  .045  .109  .071 
1966. ..  -.264  -.279  .015  .033  .018  .051  .115  .079 
1967 ...  -.236  -.238  .002  .028  .026  .055  .124  .086 
1968 ...  -.191  -.176  -.015  .044  .059  .062  .122  .087 
1969...  -.143  -.127  -.016  .049  .064  .070  .113  .085 
1970 ...  -.090  -.077  -.012  .053  .065  .080  .103  0  (.075) 
1971 ...  -.041  -.054  .013  .050  .036  .074  .094  0 (.065) 
1972...  .000  -.003  .003  .041  .038  .072  .087  0 (.056) 
1973...  .056  .057  .000  .056  .057  .074  .078  0 (.052) 
1974...  .152  .154  -.003  .095  .098  .086  .079  0 (.048) 
1975...  .241  .231  .009  .089  .079  .088  .080  0 (.046) 
1976...  .291  .293  -.002  .050  .052  .084  .076  0 (.045) 
A  B  A  B 
1977...  .364  .354  .073  .063 
1978...  .420  .410  .056  .056 
1979  ...  .463  .460  .043  .050 
1980  ...  .504  .507  .041  .047 
1981  ...  .552  .557  .048  .050 
1982  ...  .607  .612  .055  .055 
00 ...  ...  ...  .059  .061 
NOTE-P  is the  GNP  deflator  (1972  =  1.0)  (U.S.  Council  of Economic  Advisers  1977,  p.  190).  Log  (P)t 
from  1945-76  is the  estimated  value  from  eq.  (9).  Predicted  values  from  1977  on  use  the  predicted  values  of 
M  implied  by  the  money-growth-rate  predictions  in  table  1. The  predictions  also  use  the  1976  values  of Gly 
and  r. Values  of  DMR  from  1977  on  are  assumed  to be zero.  Projection  A uses the  coefficients  from  eq.  (9), 
while  projection  B utilizes  the  coefficients  from  the  joint  estimation  shown  in eq.  (13)  (with  lagged  values  up 
to  DMRt-s  included).  DPt  =  log  (Pt)  -  log  (Pt-i).  DPt  -  log  (Pt)  -  log  (Pt-i)  (based  on  the  actual 
previous  value,  log  [Pt  -1],  up  to  1977).  r is  Moody's  Aaa  index  of  corporate  bond  rates  (U.S.  Council  of 
Economic  Advisers  1977,  p.  260).  G is  real  federal  government  purchases  of  goods  and  services  in  1972 
dollars  (ibid.,  p.  187).  y  is  defined  in  the  note  to  table  1.  MIL  is  the  ratio  of  military  personnel  (U.S. 
Council  of  Economic  Advisers  1977,  p.  218)  to  the  male  population  aged  15-44  (estimated  from  data  in 
U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  [1975,  pp.  10,  15]  and  from  Statistical Abstract of the U.S.,  various  issues)  for 
years  in which  a selective  draft was  in effect.  Figures  shown  in parentheses  are the actual  values  of the military 
personnel  ratio,  ignoring  the  absence  of a selective  draft  fo.  all  or part  of those  years. 
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The  estimated  output  equation,  based  on  annual  observations  from 
1946 to 1976 and using  the residuals  from equation  (1) to measure  DMR,  is 
log  (yt)  =  2.95  +  1.04DMlRt  +  1.21DMRt-1  +  0.44DMRt-2 
(0.04)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
+  0.26DMRt-3  +  0.55MILt  +  0.0354*  t,  (3) 
(0.16)  (0.09)  (0.0004) 
R2  =  .9980,  R2  with  y  measured  relative  to  trend  =  .82,  D-W  =  1.8, 
a  =  0.016, 
where  a  again  denotes  the  standard  error  of estimate.  Additional  lagged 
values  of the  DMR  variable  are insignificant  when  added  to equation  (3). 
The  results indicate  absence  of serial  correlation  in the  residuals.  Further, 
if  a  lagged  value  of  the  dependent  variable,  log  (Yt - 1),  is added  to the 
equation,  its  estimated  coefficient,  0.06,  standard  error  =  0.09,  differs 
insignificantly  from  zero. 
As in  the  earlier  case  for unemployment,  the  output  equation  indicates 
a strong  expansionary  effect  of current  and  lagged  values  of unanticipated 
money  growth.  The  main  difference  from  the  unemployment  results 
(Barro  1977a,  p.  108  an  updated  version  of  the  unemployment-rate 
equation  is  similar  in  this  respect)  is  that  the  pattern  of  lagged  output 
response  to  DMR  shows  a  relatively  greater  weight  on  the  contempora- 
neous  value.  (Also,  the  DMRt-  3  variable,  which  was insignificant  in the 
case  of  the  unemployment  rate,  seems  to  have  a  weak  positive  effect  on 
output.)  As  before,  the  most  important  expansionary  effect  of  unantici- 
pated  money  growth  appears  in  the  1-year  lag  value,  DMR,  1 
The  sum  of  the  four  DMR  coefficients  for  output,  3.0,  implies  that  a 
money  shock  of DMR  1 percent  per  year  that  persisted  over  a 4-year 
period  (which  would  be a very  unusual  pattern  of persistence,  because  the 
anticipated  value,  DMO, makes use of lagged  observations  on actual  money 
growth)  would  raise output  by about  3.0 percent.  Since  the corresponding 
estimated  effect  on  the  unemployment  rate  (starting  from  a value  for  U 
of 5 percent)  was a reduction  by somewhat  more  than  1 percentage  point, 
there  is an implicit  Okun's  Law  type  of relation  in which  money-induced 
percentage  increases  in output  and  reductions  in percentage  points  of the 
unemployment  rate  occur  on  about  a three-to-one  basis. 
The  estimated  output  effect of the military  variable  is surprisingly  strong 
and significant,  considering  the discussion  above  of the role of this variable. 
In  fact  the  estimated  coefficient  in  equation  (3)  implies  that  military- 
induced  percentage  increases  in  output  and  reductions  in  percentage 
points  of the  unemployment  rate  occur  on  an  almost  three-to-one  basis 
that  is, along  about  the  same  estimated  Okun's  Law  relation  that  applies 
to  unanticipated  money  movements.  It  is  possible  that  the  military- 
personnel  variable  is proxying  for effects  other  than  the  influence  of draft 
pressure  on  labor  supply.  However,  the  variable  does  not  seem  to  be 
merely  a  proxy  for government  expenditure,  since  real  government  pur- 556  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
chases of goods and  services (total government or federal alone)  or of 
defense items are insignificant when added to equation (3), with the MIL 
variable remaining significant.4 
Equation  (3) also indicates an estimated trend rate of growth of real 
GNP of about 3.5 percent per year. 
Table 1 contains actual and estimated values of output relative to trend, 
log (y),  as calculated by subtracting from log (y) the estimated time trend 
and constant from equation  (3)  see the note to table  1 for details. The 
estimated  values of log  (y)  trace out  the major patterns of  boom and 
recession that are shown by the actual values. (See Barro [1977a, pp. 112- 
13] for a discussion of the business-cycle pattern in terms of the unemploy- 
ment rate in relation to the movements in the DMR series.) The equation 
underestimates the contraction of 1958-59, the boom in 1966-67, and the 
sharp cutback of output in  1975. However, the model accounts well for 
the immediate post-World War II behavior of output,  1946-49;  for the 
Korean and post-Korean experience, 1951-54;  and for the recession and 
recovery period after 1960, 1961-65. A discussion of predictions from the 
output equation will be deferred until Part IV below. 
Following the form of my previous analysis of unemployment,  I have 
tested the hypothesis that only the unanticipated part of monetary change, 
DMR,  influences output. An estimated-output equation that substitutes 
current and lagged values of actual money growth, DM,  for the DMR 
values is 
log  (yt)  =  3.13  +  0.95DMt  +  0.53DMt-L  -  0.20DMt_2 
(0.08)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.23) 
-  0.27DMt_3  +  0.31MILt  +  0.0335-t,  (4) 
(0.16)  (0.15)  (0.0007) 
R2=  .997, R2 with y  measured relative  to  trend =  .70, D-W  =  1.1, 
a  =  0.021. 
I The  estimated coefficient of the MIL variable also does not depend on the inclusion 
of the 1970-76,  nonselective draft years, for which the MIL variable was set to zero (n. 2 
above).  If the sample is limited  to the  1946-69  period,  the coefficient estimates are very 
close to those reported in eq.  (3),  and a test for including  the  1970-76  observations with 
the earlier ones yields the statistic F17  =  1.2, which  is well below the 5 percent critical 
value of 2.6.  If the military variable is not set to zero for the nonselective draft years, the 
estimated output equation over the  1946-76  period becomes 
log (yt)  =  2.95  +  0.96DMR,  +  0.94DMR,1  +  0.16DMR1-2  +  0.04DMR,-3 
(0.05)  (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.17) 
+  0.97 MILt +  0.0351 
(0.18)  (0.0004) 
R2  =  .9977, D-W  =  1.5,  a-0.017. 
The  standard error of estimate rises only slightly with this change in specification-from 
0.016 to 0.017 -but  the estimated coefficients on the DMR,  -  2  and DAMR,  -  3  variables be- 
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The relative statistical performance of equations (4) and (3) is indicated 
by the standard errors  of estimate (0.021 vs. 0.016) and by the D-W statis- 
tics (1.1 vs. 1.8). It is also worth noting that the estimated coefficients on 
DM1-2  and DM1-3  in equation  (4) are negative  (see below),  although 
individually insignificantly different from zero. 
In  order to  test for the  irrelevance of the  DM  variables for output 
determination, given the values of the DMR variables, I estimated an out- 
put equation that included simultaneously the variables DM,,...  , DM,-  3 
and  DMRL,  .  .  .,  DMR~t  3.  The  test statistic  associated  with  the  deletion 
of the four DM variables from the joint equation turns out to be Fft  =  0.2, 
so that the hypothesis that actual money growth is irrelevant for output, 
given the inclusion of unanticipated money growth, is accepted. (Note that 
a  test for irrelevance of  a  set  of  anticipated  money-growth  variables, 
DMt,  ...  ,  DMt-  3,  given  the inclusion  of the DMR variables,  would  yield 
the identical test statistic.) The reverse test associated with the deletion of 
the four DMR variables, while retaining the set of DM  values, yields the 
statistic Fft  =  3.6,  which  exceeds  the  5  percent  critical value  of  2.9. 
Hence these tests reinforce the earlier results for the unemployment rate 
concerning the importance of the DMR variables and the irrelevance of the 
DM variables. 
It should be stressed that the lag pattern of monetary effects on output 
shown in equation (3) refers to unanticipated money growth rather than 
to money growth per se. The response of output to actual values of money 
growth can be derived  assuming a given structure of the money-growth 
process, as estimated in equation  (1)  by substituting into equation  (3) 
from the condition DMR  -DM  -  DM, where DM is given from equa- 
tion (1). The resulting "reduced form" expresses output as a function of 
DMt) ... .,  DMt _ 5; FED Vt, ... .,  FEDIt _ 3; UNt - 1, *  -  , UNt-_4;  MI4t; 
and t. With respect to monetary effects on output, the point estimates of 
the lag pattern turn out to be  1.04DM,  +  0.78DMt_1  -  0.27DMt-2 
-0.17DMt-3  -0.20DMt_4  -0.05DMt  5. The positive predictive role 
of lagged values of DM  in the money-growth equation  (1) implies that 
lagged values of DM  in the reduced form have a net output effect that is 
less expansionary than the direct effect of the corresponding lagged DMR 
value  in  equation  (3)  (because values of DM  are positively related to 
earlier values of DM).  Accordingly, the lag of output behind actual money 
growth in the reduced form is shorter than that expressed in terms of un- 
anticipated money growth in equation (3). Further, negative coefficients 
can appear on lagged values of DM  in the reduced form (in the present 
case from date  t -  2 onward)  although  the output  effect of the DMR 
values  is expansionary throughout.  It  should also be  recalled that  as 
pointed  out  in  a  general  context  by  Lucas  (1972)  the  reduced-form 
expression for output as a function of DM values does not have immediate 
implications for monetary "stabilization" policy, because any (perceived) 
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such as a change in the reaction of DM, to lagged unemployment-would 
alter the coefficients of the reduced form. This point is already evident 
from the form of equation  (3), which indicates that only unanticipated 
movements of money affect output.5 
III.  Price  Level  Equation 
A.  Setup  of the  Price  Equation 
In order to derive the form of the price equation, I begin with an expres- 
sion for the demand for money, 
log (MA) -  log (P,)  =  b0 +  b1 log (Xe)  -  b2rt +  b3t  +  Et,  (5) 
where  M  is the  nominal  money  stock,  P is the  price  level  (GNP  deflator), 
X  is  a  measure  of  real  expenditure  pertinent  to  money  demand,  r is  a 
nominal  interest  rate  (measured  empirically  by  the  Aaa  corporate  bond 
rate;  see  below),  t is  a  time  trend,  and  ?  is  a  random  term  that  is  not 
necessarily  independent  of the  stochastic  term,  u, in  the  output  equation 
(2).  The  coefficients  satisfy  the  conditions  b1 >  0,  b2  >  0,  b3  'c  0,  with 
the  last  coefficient  reflecting  any  trend  elements  in  money  demand  asso- 
ciated  with  the development  of financial  institutions,  etc.  The  formulation 
in  equation  (5)  neglects  any  lags  in  the  adjustment  of money  demand  to 
changes  in  X,  r, etc.  Although  this  representation  is convenient,  the  sub- 
sequent  empirical  results suggest  that it may  be too restrictive.  Hence  some 
possibilities  for lagged  adjustment  of money  demand  are  considered  in  a 
later  section. 
The  real  expenditure  determinant  of money  demand,  X,  is assumed  to 
be  linearly  related  to real  GNP  (denoted  again  byy)  for a given  value  of 
real  federal  purchases  of goods  and  services,  G. For a given  value  of total 
GNP,  an  increase  in  G reduces  the  volume  of  expenditure  pertinent  to 
money  demand  (especially  since federal  government  holdings  of money  are 
excluded  from  the  money-stock  definition),  so that  X  is inversely  related 
to  G. I  use  the  specification 
X  =  c(y  -  yG),  (6) 
where  c  >  0  and  0  <  y  <  1.  The  value  y  =  1 would  apply  if  federal 
purchases  of  goods  and  services  were  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  quantity 
of real  money  demanded  by the  nonfederal  sector.  Since  government  pur- 
chases  involve  sales  of  equal  magnitude  from  the  nonfederal  sector  and 
since  money  demand  would  depend  on  the  volume  of  both  sales  and 
purchases  in  this  sector  (with  the  components  of GNP  other  than  federal 
purchases  implying  both  a final sale and  a final  purchase  in the nonfederal 
'  However,  eq.  (3)  is  itself  a  partial  reduced  form-e.g.,  shifts  in  the  variance  of  the 
money-growth  process  would  he  expected  to  alter  the  coefficients  of  the  DMR  variables 
along  the  lines  discussed  in  Lucas  (1973)  and  Barro  (1976). UNANTICIPATED  MONEY,  OUTPUT,  AND  PRICE  LEVEL  559 
sector),6  the  value  y  4- may  be  reasonable.  The  exclusion  of state  and 
local  government  purchases  from  the  G variable  amounts  to  treating  the 
state  and  local  sector  as  comparable  to  the  private  sector  in  terms  of 
money-demand  behavior.  (Empirically,  for the period  considered,  it is not 
possible  to  distinguish  the  definition  of  G  exclusive  of  state  and  local 
government  purchases  from that  inclusive  of these purchases.)  The  present 
formulation  also  neglects  any  effect  of  government  transfer  activities  on 
money  demand.  (Empirically,  the inclusion  of federal  or total  government 
transfers in the  G variable  does not  have  a significant  effect  on the results.) 
Using  equations  (5)  and  (6)  and  the  approximation  log  (y  -  yG)  - 
log  (y)  -  yG/y, which  is satisfactory  over the sample  period since  yG/y  <  1 
applies,  leads  to the  price  level  equation  log  (Pt)  =  constant  +  log  (Mt) 
-  b1 log  (yt)  +  b1y(G/y),  +  b2r,  -  b3t  -  Et. Substituting  for  log  (yt) 
from  equation  (2)  then  implies 
log  (Pt)  =  constant  +  log  (M,)  -  b1(a1DMRt  +  a2DMR,-1 
+  a3DMR,-2  +  a4DMRt-3)  -  bla5MILt  +  by(G/y)t  (7) 
+  b2rt -  (b1a6  +  b3)t  -  (et  +  blu,). 
Abstracting  for the moment  from possible  endogeneity  of some of the right- 
hand  variables  (notably  G/y  and  r),  equation  (7)  implies  the  following 
hypotheses  concerning  monetary  effects  on  the  price  level  :7 
1.  Given  current  and  lagged  DMR  values  (and  the  nominal  interest 
rate,  r,, which  would  reflect  anticipated  inflation  rates),  there  is a one-to- 
one  effect  of log  (MA)  on log  (Pt). Fullyperceived  movements  in the money 
stock  which  correspond  to changes  in M,  while  holding  fixed  current  and 
lagged  DMR  values  (weighted  in accordance  with  their  effects  on  current 
output)-have  equiproportionate,  contemporaneous  effects  on  the  price 
level. 
2.  Current  and  lagged  values  of DMR  have  negative  effects  on the price 
level  (for given  values  of Mt,  rt, etc.).  The  pattern  of lagged  DMR  effects 
corresponds,  with  the opposite  sign,  to the pattern  in the output  equation. 
If  real  money  demand  is unit  elastic  in  real  expenditure  (b1  -  1),  then 
the  DMR  pattern  in  the  price  level  equation  corresponds  in  magnitude 
6 This  statement  does  not  hold  for  international  transactions  components  of  GNP, 
which  may  be  worth  further  examination  in  the  context  of  demand  for  money.  A  more 
general  discussion  of  the  transactions  measure  in  money-demand  functions  is  contained 
in  Fnzler,  Johnson,  and  Paulus  (1976). 
My  initial  inclination  was  to specify  an  equation  in terms  of the  inflation  rate,  DP,- 
log  (Pt)  -  log  (Pt-,),  rather  than  the  price  level.  From  the  perspective  of  eq.  (7),  it  is 
clear  that  the  inflation  rate  would  depend  on  the  current  money-growth  rate,  DMt,  and 
on  changes in  the  DMR  and  other  variables  that  appear  on  the  right-hand  side  of the  price 
level  equation.  If the  error  term  in  eq.  (7)  is serially  independent  (or does  not  show  strong 
positive  serial  correlation),  then  the  error  in  the  first-difference  rate  of  inflation  form 
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and shape to the pattern in the output equation.8  More generally, the 
DM1  patterns would correspond  in shape but not necessarily  in magnitude. 
3. Given M,  and the DMR values  (and r,, etc.),  lagged values of the 
money stock-M,_1,  M-2,  .  .  .  -or,  equivalently,  current and lagged 
values of actual money growth  DM,, DM-1,  ..  .  are irrelevant to the 
determination of the price level. 
4. In the present formulation, changes in expected inflation rates that 
correspond to changes in expected growth rates of money or other vari- 
ables are reflected in the nominal interest rate, r,. The relation between 
monetary  movements  and  r, has  not  yet  been  explored.  However,  an 
increase in r,, for given values of the DMRs, etc., has a positive effect on Pt. 
B.  Estimated-Price  Equation 
Two  problems with  estimation of equation  (7)  are the  endogeneity  of 
(G/y)  ,  through  its  dependence  on y,,  and  the  likely  endogeneity  of  r,. 9 
With  respect  to the  G/y variable,  I have  made  two modifications  that yield 
essentially  equivalent  results.  First,  I  have  used  G/3  as an  instrument  for 
G/y,  where y  is the  value  exp  [log  (y)]  and  log  (y)  is calculated  from  the 
estimated-output  equation  (3).  Second,  I  have  changed  the  specification 
of  equation  (7)  by  replacing  G/y with  log  (G).  This  procedure  and  the 
previous  one  yield  essentially  the  same  statistical  fit for the  price  equation 
and  also  yield  similar  estimates  for the  coefficients  of the  other  variables. 
Since  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  G/y variable  in the  first approach  is 
readily  interpreted  in terms  of the  underlying  model,  I report  only  results 
in  this  form. 
With  respect  to the interest-rate  variable  (the Aaa  corporate  bond  rate), 
the estimation  problem  would  derive  from correlation  with  the error term 
of equation  (7).  (It can be noted  that  this estimation  problem  is equivalent 
to the  familiar  one  of estimating  the  coefficient  of a nominal  interest  rate 
as one  of the  right-hand  variables  in  a money-demand  function.)  Since  I 
have  not  yet  developed  an  analysis  that  relates  the  interest  rate  to exog- 
enous  variables  such  as  money  shocks,  expected  growth  rates  of money, 
8  Equivalently,  nominal  income  would  be  invariant  with  the  DMRs  (for  given  values 
of  M, and  r,)  in  this  case.  I  treat  nominal  income  throughout  as a derivative  concept,  im- 
plied by the underlying values of output and the price level, rather than using the  (odd, 
but  popular)  approach  of  determining  nominal  income  first and  then  considering  its 
breakdown between  output  and the price level. 
9 The error terms of eqq. (7) and (2) would not generally be independent,  although the 
correlation between e, (shifts in money demand)  and ut (shifts in output)  would also have 
to be taken into account.  Surprisingly, it turns out that the estimated  residuals from the 
two equations  are not significantly  correlated:  the correlation is  +0.15  for the residuals 
from eqq.  (3)  and  (9).  In  general,  a joint  estimation  of eqq.  (7)  and  (2)  could  exploit 
any  relation  among  the  error terms,  but  the  impact  of  this  extension  turns out  to  be 
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and other factors, I have carried out estimation of the price equation with 
a lagged interest rate variable, r,-1,  used as an instrument for r,.'0  The 
use of rt  -  I  as an  instrument would  eliminate  correlation between  the 
interest-rate variable and the error term of equation (7) (thereby leading 
to consistent estimation at the expense of some lost efficiency) if the error 
term is itself serially uncorrelated. The  estimation of the price equation 
might be improved by the development of an empirical model of interest- 
rate determination (which I plan to work on). However, the main short- 
coming of the present procedure may not be with estimation of the co- 
efficients in equation (7) but, rather, with the lack of a full reduced-form 
description of the influence of money, etc., on the price level. The channels 
of monetary effects on prices that involve variations in the nominal interest 
rate are not observed when the interest-rate variable is held fixed sepa- 
rately, as in the present analysis. 
Another possible problem with  estimation of equation  (7)  would  be 
correlation of the error in the money-growth equation  that is, DMR 
with the errors  in the money-demand or output equations. The first corre- 
lation could arise if the monetary authority is willing and able to "offset" 
shifts in money demand. The second correlation would appear if counter- 
cyclical monetary response operates with a shorter lag than that assumed 
in  equation  (1) 11  (The  correlation with  the  contemporaneous output 
shock would also affect the estimate of the DMRt coefficient in the output 
equation  [3].)  Although  the  present analysis does not  deal  with  these 
problems, it seems that the most serious questions would arise about the 
estimate of the DMRt coefficient in equation (7). It also seems that corre- 
lation of the DMR variables with the error term in equation (7) would not 
prejudice the results toward acceptance of the null hypotheses that were 
set out above. 
From some preliminary work, it became clear that the immediate post- 
World War II observations on the price level were heavily influenced by 
a residual effect of the extensive wartime controls (see below for a formal 
analysis of this period). Accordingly, I concentrate the empirical analysis 
on  price equations that are estimated over the  1948-76  period. It  also 
turned  out  that  two  additional  lagged  values  of  the  DMR  variable, 
DMRt  4  and DMRt5,  were significant when added to equation (7), so 
that the reported results include the values DMR,  ...  ,  DMRt-  5.  The 
MIL variable, which was important in the output equation, turns out to 
10  An OLS regression of rT on rt  -'  alone from 1948 to  1976 fields 
rt=  0.001  +  1.01rt-1,  R2  =  .96,  D-W  =  1.7,  & =  0.004. 
(0.002)  (0.04) 
1  l However, preliminary results with quarterly data suggest that biases from this source 
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be insignificant in the price equation, and I report results separately with 
this variable excluded. 
Table 3 contains the basic empirical results for the price equation. The 
results apply to annual observations for the 1948-76 period and measure P 
by the GNP deflator (1972 base) and r by the Aaa corporate bond rate.12 
Results are given with the MIL variable excluded or included and with the 
coefficient of log (Mt) unrestricted or constrained to equal unity, in which 
case  log (P,)  -  log (Mt) becomes the effective dependent variable. For 
convenience, I write out the estimated equation (from table 3, line 1) that 
excludes  the  MIL  variable  and  leaves the  coefficient on  log (Mt)  un- 
restricted: 
log (P,)  -4.60  +  1.02 log (M)  -0.  74DMR,  -  1.48DMR- 
(9.26)  (0.07)  (0.17)  (0.21) 
-  1.79DMRt-2  -  1.36DMRt-3  -  0.72DMRt-4 
(0.25)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (8) 
-  0.34DMRt -5  +  0.59(G/y)t  +  3.7r, -  0.0108  t, 
(0.16)  (0.14)  (1.1)  (0.0020) 
R  =  .9987, D-W  =  1.8, a  =  0.012. 
The  addition of the insignificant MIL variable has a negligible effect 
on the estimates (table 3, line 2).  The  results indicate absence of serial 
correlation in  the residuals. Further, if a lagged  dependent variable is 
added to equation  (8), its estimated coefficient, 0.07, SE  =  0.27, differs 
insignificantly from zero.  It  also  turns out  that  ordinary-least-squares 
(OLS)  estimates are close to those shown in equation  (8), in which G/j 
and rt  - 1 were used as instruments. The main difference in the OLS results 
is a reduction in the estimated coefficients of the G/y and r variables, which 
become 0.52, SE  =  0.11, and 2.7, SE  =  0.6, respectively. 
Test of a unit coefficient  on log(M,).-The  estimated coefficient  of  the 
log (Mt) variable in equation (8), 1.02, SE  =  0.07, conforms with the null 
hypothesis of a unit coefficient. With lagged values of the money stock 
excluded from equations (7) and (8) (tests of this proposition are carried 
out below), the hypothesis of a unit coefficient on log (Mt) can be viewed 
as a test for the absence of money illusion. In this sense this hypothesis may 
be regarded as being on a different level  (less specific to the particular 
theory under test but essential for confidence in the other results) from the 
other propositions to be considered. Accordingly,  table 3 provides esti- 
mates of price level equations in which the coefficient of log (Mt) is con- 
strained to be exactly unity  (which amounts to using the negative of the 
12  The  interest  rate  on  prime  commercial  paper  and  the  rate  on  savings  and  loan 
shares  are  insignificant  when  added  to  eqq.  (8)  or  (9)  below. -  r-  0)  ir)  C1  CC)  _ 
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log of real money balances as a dependent variable). The estimated equa- 
tion with this constraint that corresponds in form to equation (8) is, from 
table 3, line 3, 
log (P,)  =  -4.55  +  log (Mt)  -  0. 74DMR,  -  1.48DMRt1 
(0.13)  (0.17)  (0.20) 
-  1.78DMRt-2  -  1.34DMRt-3-0.69DMRt-4 
(0.24)  (0.22)  (0.17)  (9) 
-  0.32DMRt-5  +  0.59(G/y)t  +  3.8rt -  0.0106  t, 
(0.14)  (0.14)  (0.9)  (0.0018) 
R  =  .9987, D-W =  1.  7, 6f =  0.012. 
Again,  the estimates are not materially affected by including  the in- 
significant MIL variable (table 3, line 4),  and there is no indication of 
serial correlation in the residuals. If the lagged variable, log (P/M)  -  1  15 
added to equation  (9), its estimated coefficient, 0.10, SE  =  0.21, differs 
insignificantly from zero. Ordinary-least-squares  estimates are again close 
to the instrumental estimates, except for some reduction in the estimated 
coefficients of the  G/y and r variables. The  OLS  estimates of these co- 
efficients are 0.50, SE  =  0. 11, and 2.9, SE  =  0.5, respectively. 
Estimates  of DMR  coefficients.-All  six of the estimated DMR coefficients 
in equation (9) are negative  that is, conforming in sign to the underlying 
theory-and  all  are individually  significantly different from zero.  The 
precision with which the lagged response of the price level to unanticipated 
money growth is estimated and the smooth triangular shape of the lag 
pattern are striking features of the results. 
In terms of quantitative correspondence to the DMR lag pattern esti- 
mated  in  the  output  equation  (3),  it  can  be seen that  the DMR,  and 
DMR-  i  coefficients correspond reasonably well, but the coefficients on 
the other lag values are much larger in magnitude in the price equation 
than  in  the  output  equation.  The  significance  of  the  DMR _4  and 
DMRt  -  5  variables in  the  price  equation,  as  contrasted with  their in- 
significance in the output equation, is one aspect of this cross-equation 
discrepancy. A formal comparison of the DMR coefficients from the price 
and output equations is carried out below. 
Test  for irrelevance  of actual  money-growth  variables. The price level equa- 
tion can also be estimated with the DMR values replaced by correspond- 
ing values of actual money growth, DM. Since log (Mt) is included sepa- 
rately as an explanatory variable, this form of the price equation amounts 
to regressing log (Pr) on log (MI), log (MI-1),  .  . , log (MI-6),  and the 
other explanatory variables. Table  3, lines 5-8,  reports results based on 
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wise  corresponds  in form  to equation  (9)  is, from  line  7 of the  table, 
log  (P,)  =  -5.36  +  log  (Mt)  -  1.32DM,  -  0.72DM,1 
(0.33)  (0.25)  (0.29) 
-  0.81DMt-2  -  0.02DMt_3  -  0.16DMt_4  +  0.34DMt  5 
(0.29)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.21) 
+  0.70(G/y)t  +  l.lrt  -  0.0009  t,  (10) 
(0.34)  (1. 1)  (0.0031) 
R  =  .9965,  D-W  =  1.3,  a  0.019. 
Two  observations  on the estimates  are, first, that  the DM  variables  provide 
a much  poorer  fit to the  price  level  than  that  obtained  with  the  use of the 
DMR  values  (6  =  0.012  from  eq.  a9]  vs.  a  =  0.019  from  eq.  [10])  and, 
second,  that  the  estimated  pattern  of  coefficients  in  the  DM  form  is 
difficult  to interpret. 
The  test for irrelevance  of lagged  DM  values  in the price  level  equation 
given  the values  of log  (Mt)  and  the DMR  variables  can be carried out 
by  running  a  regression  of  log  (Pt)  on  an  array  of  explanatory  variables 
that  includes  simultaneously  the  two  sets  DMR,  ..  . ,  DMRS  and 
DMt,  ..  ,  DM,  - 5 and  then  examining  the  impact  on the  sum of squared 
residuals  of  deleting  the  set  of  DM  values.  This  procedure,  for  the  case 
where  the  MIL  variable  is  excluded  and  the  log  (Mt)  coefficient  is con- 
strained  to equal  unity,  yields  the test statistic  F%  =  1.7, 5 percent  critical 
value  =  2.9.13  Therefore  the  hypothesis  that  current  and  lagged  values 
of DM  [and hence  the values of log  (Mt - 1  ),  ...  , log  (MI  -  6)  ]  are irrelevant 
to  the  determination  of  Pt  given  the  values  of  Mt  and  the  DMRs  is 
accepted.  A  reverse  test  for the  deletion  of the  six DMR  variables,  while 
retaining  the  set of  DM  values,  yields  the  statistic  F63  =  7.9,  so that  the 
importance  of the DMRs  (and  the empirical  distinction  between  the DMR 
and  DM  concepts)  is confirmed  by  this test.  The  same  conclusions  obtain 
if the MIL variable  is included  and if the log  (Mt) coefficient  is unrestricted. 
A simultaneous  test that  the coefficient  of the log  (Mt)  variable  is unity and 
that  the  set  of DM  variables  is irrelevant,  which  involves  a  test  of seven 
coefficient  restrictions,  yields  the statistic  (with the MIL variable  excluded) 
F  2  =  1.7,  which  is below  the  5 percent  critical  value  of  2.9.  (A  simul- 
taneous  test that  the  log  [M,]  coefficient  is unity  and  that  the  DMR  vari- 
ables  are  irrelevant  yields  F  2  =  7.2.)  The  acceptance  of  the  joint  hy- 
pothesis  that  the  log  (Mt)  coefficient  is  equal  to unity  and  that  the  set of 
DM  variables  is irrelevant  is important,  because  it implies  acceptance  of the 
basic  hypothesis  that  perceived  movements  in  the  money  stock-that  is, 
13  In the context of instrumental estimates, this critical value is only an approximation. 566  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
changes in M, with the DMR values and r, held constant-imply  equi- 
proportionate, contemporaneous movements in the price level. 
Estimates  of other  coefficients  in the  price  equation.-The estimated coefficient 
of the G/y variable in equation  (9), 0.59, SE  =  0.14, is positive, signifi- 
cantly different from zero, and in the vicinity of the plausible value of 2' 
(assuming a unit income elasticity of money demand, b1: see below). The 
tabulation of this variable in table 2 indicates that the movement of G/y 
(which is based on federal purchases of goods and services  a concept that 
is dominated by defense expenditure) has been downward since 1968. The 
drop in G/y from 0.12 in  1968 to 0.08 in  1976 implies, according to the 
estimated coefficient from equation (9), that the 1976 price level is about 
2.5 percent lower than it would have been if G/y had remained at its 1968 
level. The other important movement of G/y during the sample period is 
the sharp increase with the start of the Korean War in 1951, followed by 
a strong decrease from 1953 to 1955. The 1951 movement of federal expen- 
diture implies, on this count, an estimated price level increase from 1950 
of about 3 percent (although the estimated price level for 1951 is still about 
1.5 percent below the actual value).  The expenditure decline from 1953 
to 1955 implies, on this count, a price level decrease by about 3 percent. 
The  point  estimate  of  the  interest-rate  coefficient  in  equation  (9) 
implies a money-demand elasticity of -0.19  at the sample mean of r over 
the  1948-76  period and  an elasticity of  -0.32  at  the  1976 value  of r. 
It should be noted that the interest-rate variable is important for "explain- 
ing" some of the recent movements in the price level. For example, the rise 
in the interest rate from 0.074 in  1973 to 0.086 in  1974 "accounts for" 
0.046 out of the total price level increase of 0.095 for 1974. It is likely that 
the interest-rate movements reflect changes in anticipated inflation, but 
the present analysis does not make that connection explicit. 
The estimated time trend,  -0.01  1, SE  =  0.002, is significantly nega- 
tive, but only 1.1 percent per year in magnitude. Since the estimated time- 
trend coefficient in the output equation  (3) is 0.035, it follows from the 
forms of equations (5) and (7) that the estimates imply a negative trend in 
the demand for money over the 1948-76 period of about 2.4 percent per 
year (assuming a unit income elasticity of money demand, b1: see below). 
It would be preferable to relate this trend to movements in variables that 
explicitly measure changes in financial structure or other forces, especially 
since the stability of the relation between money demand and time per se 
is doubtful. However, I have not made any progress along these lines. 
As mentioned above, the estimated coefficient of the MIL variable is 
insignificant throughout (table 3, lines 2, 4, 6, 8), although the standard 
error of about 0.2 in the DMR equations is substantial. This result con- 
trasts with  the significant, positive coefficient on the MIL variable that 
was obtained in the output equation (3) (0.55, SE  =  0.09). In light of the UNANTICIPATED  MONEY,  OUTPUT,  AND  PRICE  LEVEL  567 
discussion of the military variable in Part II above, the insignificant effect 
on the price level does more to provide further doubt about the meaning 
of the estimated effect on output rather than to question the price level 
results. 
Cross-equation  tests  of coefficients  in the  price  and output  equations. As noted 
above,  the pattern of estimated DMR coefficients in the price equation 
appears to differ from that in the output equation. A formal test of corre- 
spondence  of these two sets of coefficients  involves,  first, a joint  estimation 
of the  output  and  price  equations  subject  to the  constraint  that  the DMR 
coefficients  be of opposite  sign and  equal  magnitude  aside from multiplica- 
tion  by  the  income  elasticity  of money  demand,  b1, in  equation  (7)  and, 
second,  a comparison  by means  of a likelihood  ratio  test of the residuals  in 
the  constrained  calculation  with  those  from  the  unconstrained  case.  The 
constrained  estimates  are  determined  from  a  nonlinear  three-stage  least- 
squares  routine  (from  the  TSP  regression  package),  which  also  provides 
estimates  of  the  variances  and  contemporaneous  covariance  of  the  error 
terms  across  the  output  and  price  equations.  In  the  present  circumstance 
this  covariance  turns  out  to  be  negligible  (n.  9  above).  For  purposes  of 
carrying  out  a likelihood  ratio  test,  the  estimates  that  omit  constraints  on 
the  coefficients  have  also  been  obtained  from  the  joint  procedure  that 
includes  estimates  of the variances  and  contemporaneous  covariance  of the 
error  terms.  In  the  present  context,  the  output  and  price  level  equations 
are  both  estimated  over  the  1948-76  period  with  DMRt, . . .,  DMR,_  5 
used as explanatory  variables.  The  military  variable  has also been  included 
in both  equations.  In one set of calculations,  a separate  military  coefficient 
was  estimated  for the  price  and  output  equations  in  both  unconstrained 
and  constrained  forms,  while  in  another  set  the  two  military  coefficients 
were  restricted  in the constrained  form,  along  with  the DMR variables,  to 
have  coefficients  in  the  two  equations  that  were  of  opposite  sign  and  of 
equal  magnitude  except  for multiplication  by b1 in equation  (7).  Since  the 
size of the estimated  MIL coefficient  is much  higher  in the output  equation 
than  in the price  equation,  it would  be anticipated  that  the null hypothesis 
of  corresponding  coefficients  across  the  two  equations  is less  likely  to  be 
accepted  when  the  restriction  on  the  MIL coefficients  is included  as part 
of the  null  hypothesis. 
The  basic  outcome  of the  cross-equation  test is that  the  null  hypothesis 
of consistent  DMR  coefficients  in  the  output  and  price  level  equations  is 
rejected  at  the  5  percent  level.  For  example,  for  the  case  where  the  co- 
efficient  of  log  (Me)  in  the  price  equation  is  restricted  to  equal  unity 
(results  are similar  if this coefficient  is unrestricted)  and  the  coefficients  of 
the two MIL variables  are left unrestricted  throughout,  the likelihood  ratio 
implies  the test statistic,  which  is distributed  asymptotically  as a x  2 variable 
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this  case  5),  of  19.1,  which  exceeds  the  5 percent  critical  value  of  11.1.  .4 
For the  case where  the  two  MIL  coefficients  are also constrained  as a part 
of  the  null  hypothesis,  the  test  statistic  is  41.1,  which  is  well  above  the 
5 percent  critical  value  with  6 degrees  of freedom  of  12.6. 
Lagged adjustment  of money demand.-The  statistical  tests  above  support 
the  impression  from  equations  (3)  and  (9)  that  the  pattern  of price  level 
response  to the DMR  variables  is drawn  out relative  to the output  response. 
From  the  perspective  of the  underlying  model,  an  obvious  possibility  for 
"explaining"  this  behavior  would  be  to  modify  the  form  of  the  money- 
demand  function,  as expressed  in equations  (5)  and  (6),  to allow  for some 
dependence  of log  (M/P),  on lagged  values  of the explanatory  variables 
log  (y),  G/y, and r. However,  the most common  form of partial adjustment, 
which  would  amount  to introducing  log  (M/P),  -  as an additional  deter- 
minant  of current  money  demand,  would  not  account  for the results.  This 
form would  rationalize  the inclusion  of the lagged  variable,  log  (P/M),  -1, 
in  the  price  equation  (7).  However,  as noted  above,  the  estimated  coeffi- 
cient  of  this  variable  differs  insignificantly  from  zero.  Put  another  way, 
this  form  of  partial  adjustment  implies  that  log  (P,),  relative  to log  (M,), 
would  depend  on a distributed  lag of log  (y),  G/y, and  r, which  implies  not 
only  an  elongated  response  of  the  price  level  to  the  DMR  variables  but 
also  a dependence  of the  current  price  level  on  lagged  values  of G/y and  r 
(and  MIL).  In fact lagged  values  of G/y and  r (and  MIL)  are insignificant 
when  added  to  equation  (7)  (in  an  OLS  regression),  which  is consistent 
with  the insignificant  effect  of the log  (P/M),  -  variable  that was referred 
to  above. 
A  form  of  partial  adjustment  that  can  account  for  the  cross-equation 
results  involves  a special  response  of money  demand  to  temporary  move- 
ments  in  income,  as  stressed  by  Darby  (1972).  Consider  the  division  of 
log(y,)  from  equation  (2)  into  a  "temporary"  component,  log(yT)  = 
aDMRt  +  a2DMRt-1  +  a3DMRt-2  +  a4DMRt-3  +  Ut, and a "perma- 
nent"  component,  log(y')  =  ao  +  a5MILt  4- a6t.  Suppose  that  tempo- 
rary  income  has  a strong  effect  on  current  money  demand  that  dissipates 
only  gradually  in  accordance  with  an  adjustment  parameter,  A. In  this 
case  a modified  form  of the  money-demand  function  would  be'  5 
14  The  constrained  coefficient  estimates  and  asymptotic  standard  errors  for  this  case 
are,  for  the  income  elasticity  of  money  demand,  b,  =  1.42  (0.23);  for  the  DMR  co- 
efficients,  a,  =  0.72  (0.15),  a2  =  0.94  (0.15),  a3  =  0.87  (0.15),  a4  =  0.60  (0.13), 
a5  =  0.29  (0.10),  a6  =  0.19  (0.08);  and  for  the  other  coefficients, 
log  (yv)  =  2.930  +  0.70M1L,  +  0.0355-t, 
(0.053)  (0.11)  (0.0005) 
log  (P,)  =  -4.765  +  log  (M,)  +  0.37(Gjy),  +  2.0r,  -  0.0074-t  +  0.04MIL,. 
(0.131)  (0.17)  (0.9)  (0.0017)  (0.17) 
5 The  GJ  and  MIL  variables  are  treated  as "permanent"  elements  in this  specification. UNANTICIPATED  MONEY,  OUTPUT,  AND  PRICE  LEVEL  569 
log (Ml)  -  log 
(P,) 
=  bo +  b  jlog  (y/)  -  7(G/y) ]  -  b2rt +  b3t 
+  b4[10g  (yt)  +  (1  -  2) log  (YTl)  +  (1  2  2)  log  (yT-  2)  +  * * 
+  Et,  (1 1) 
where 0  <  2  <  1, b1 is the elasticity of money demand with respect to 
permanent income, and b4 is the elasticity with respect to current tem- 
porary income.1  6 
From the definitions above of log (y/)  and log  (yrT),  equation (11) can 
be used to obtain a price equation that generalizes equation (7), 
log (Pt) =  constant +  log (Mt)  -  b4{a1[DMRt +  (1 -2)DMRt_1 
+  ]  +  a2[DMRt-  1  +  (1  -  2)DMR,  2  +  ..'.  +  a3(DMR1-2 
+  . .  .)  +  a4(DMR  _3  +  . . .)}  -  b1a5MILt +  b1y(G/y)t +  b2rt 
-  (b1a6 +  b3)t  -  Et  -  bI [ut  +  (1  -  )ut_ 1  +  .  .  .].  (12) 
Accordingly, each variable DMRt -  is now replaced by a distributed lag, 
DMRt-i  +  (1 -  2)DMRt- ii  +  ....  It is also apparent from equation 
(12) that values of 2 below one will generate, at least qualitatively, the 
observed pattern of behavior in which the price level response to DMR 
values  is  elongated  relative  to  the  output  response. Moreover,  in  this 
formulation it is only the contemporaneous values of G/y, r, and MIL that 
would affect the current price level.1  " 
The  output and price level estimates can now be examined for cross- 
equation consistency from the standpoint of the output equation (2) and 
the modified price equation  (12).  Since b4 and 2 have to be estimated 
(by means of the nonlinear three-stage least-squares procedure), there are 
now only two restrictions corresponding to the imposition of a common 
set of coefficients, a,,  . . . , a4, across the two equations. However, the form 
of equation (12) for the price level implies two additional restrictions rela- 
tive to the form in equation (9), which permitted unrestricted coefficient 
estimates on DMRt,.  . .,  DMRt-  5.  (Lagged values only up to DMR,  5 
are also used in the restricted form.) The basic finding is that the results 
16  The  log-linear form is solely for algebraic convenience.  Darby's  (1972, pp. 929-30) 
discussion suggests that a different functional form may be more appropriate for relating 
"transitory money demand"  to "transitory income."  However,  the log-linear representa- 
tion seems adequate  to account for the present empirical results. 
17  The error term in eq.  (12) would show positive serial correlation if 0  <  A <  1 and 
Et and ut are serially independent.  In fact the estimated residuals from the price equation 
(9) do not exhibit serial correlation. One possible explanation is that the ut part of "transi- 
tory income" does not have the distributed lag effect on money demand that is postulated 
in eq. (11). It is also necessary to reconcile the lack of correlation between the residuals of 
eqq.  (3) and  (9)  (n. 9 above)  and the lower value of & from the price equation  (9) than 
that in the output equation  (3).  In the context of the forms of the error terms in eqq.  (2) 
and  (12),  these results require strong negative  correlation between  the output  shift  (ut) 
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are in accord with these restrictions. For the case of a unit coefficient on 
log (M,)  (and where no cross-equation restriction is imposed on the MIL 
coefficients),'  8  the  likelihood  ratio  implies  a test  statistic  of 5.1,  which  is 
below the 5 percent critical value for the x2  distribution with 4 degrees of 
freedom of 9.5. Hence the generalization of the money-demand function 
does reconcile the apparent conflict between the output and price level 
responses to the DMR  values. The  full set of constrained estimates and 
asymptotic standard errors is 
Current temporary income elasticity of money demand: 
b4  =  0.85, SE  =  0.13, 
adjustment parameter: i  =  0.40, SE  =  0.07, 
common DMR coefficients: a,  =  0.98, a2  =  1.15, a3  =0.68,  a4 =0.24, 
(0.17)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17) 
log (yt)  =  2.942  +  0.58M11ILt  +  0.0355  t (R2 =  .9975, D-W  =  1.9), 
(0.047)  (0.10)  (0.0004) 
log (P,)  =  -4.641  +  log (AJ,) +  0.47(G/y),  +  3.0r,  (13) 
(0.115)  (0.15)  (0.8) 
-0.0092  - t +  0.01MILt (R2 =  .9986, D-W  =  1.8). 
(0.0015)  (0.15) 
The estimates for a,,  . . .,  a4, together with the values for b4 and 2 and 
the form of equation  (12), imply that the estimates for the DMRt, . . .. 
DMRt-  5  variables in  the  unrestricted form of  the  price equation  (9) 
should be  -0.83,  -1.48,  -1.46,  -1.08,  -0.65,  and  -0.39.'9  As sug- 
gested by the likelihood ratio test statistic above, these figures accord well 
with the unrestricted estimates shown in equation (9). 
In one sense these results indicate conformity between the output and 
price level coefficient estimates in the context of a perhaps plausible money- 
demand representation that allows for gradually dissipating effects of tem- 
porary income (with an adjustment coefficient, 2, on the order of 0.4 per 
year).  On  the  other hand,  the  admission of partial adjustment in  the 
money-demand  function  while  possibly  theoretically  and  empirically 
warranted  substantially weakens the discriminatory power of the cross- 
equation tests. Since the utilized form of adjustment is only one of many 
possible specifications and since the chosen form was dictated more by 
prior empirical results than from ex ante theorizing, it seems clear that 
these results do  not  provide strong support for the  underlying model. 
1  8  A cross-equation  restriction  would arise here only if the value of b  1 or y were specified 
ex ante.  For plausible values of b1 or y,  it still seems that the output  effect of the MIL 
variable is unduly large relative to the price level effect. 
19  The  DA4R,6  coefficient  would  be  -0.23.  If this variable is added  to eq.  (9),  its 
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Rather,  the results have a more modest  interpretation-that  cross-equation 
inconsistency  would  not  be  a basis  for rejecting  the  model. 
Lagged response  of the price level to money  movements.-As  in  the  case  of the 
output  equation,  the  effects  of  lagged  money  growth  on  the  price  level 
have  been  expressed  in terms of DMR  values  rather  than  DM  values.  The 
response  of log  (P,) to current  and lagged  values  of money  can be derived- 
again  assuming  the  stability  of the  money-growth  process,  as estimated  in 
equation  (I)-by  using  the  condition  DMR  _DM  -  DM,  where  DM 
is determined  from equation  (1).  (This  procedure  holds  fixed  the  nominal 
interest  rate,  rt, and therefore  misses any monetary  effects on the price level 
that  operate  through  interest-rate  variations.  The  G/y variable  is also held 
fixed  in  this  analysis.)  Substituting  for the  DMR  values  in  equation  (12) 
and  using  the joint  coefficient  estimates  listed  in  equation  (13)  leads  to 
the  following  point  estimates  of  the  reduced-form  lag  effects  from  the 
money  stock  to the  price  level  (which  is equivalent  to the  lag  effects  from 
actual  money  growth,  DM,  to the  inflation  rate)  :2?  0. 17 log  (M,)  -  0.31 
log  (M,-1)  +  0.46  log  (MI-2)  +  0.51  log  (MI-3)  +  0.27  log  (MI-4)  + 
0.00  log  (M  -5) -0.03  log (MI -6)  -0.03  log (MI -7) +  0.01 log (MI-8). 
Two  important  observations  about  this lag  pattern  are,  first, that  there  is 
at  most  a weak  near-term  positive  link  between  the  money  stock  and  the 
price level  and,  second,  that there is a long  lag-in  the 2- to 4-year  range- 
in  the  main  positive  effect  of money  on  the  price  level.21  With  regard  to 
the  first  observation,  a  point  to  stress  is  that  this  weak  near-term  link 
between  money  and  prices  is consistent  with  the property  that  anticipated 
money  movements  are  reflected  in  one-to-one,  contemporaneous  move- 
ments  of  the  price  level.  This  basic  hypothesis  associated  with  a  unit 
coefficient  on log  (M,)  and with  the irrelevance  of the DM  variables  in the 
price  equation  has  already  been  accepted  for the  equation  that  yielded 
the  pattern  above  of  reduced-form  lag  effects  from  money  to  prices.22 
The  long  lag  in  the  response  of the  price  level  to  money  movements  can 
be  "explained"  from  two  elements  first,  the  dependence  of  output  on 
lagged  values  of the  DMR  variable,  which  would  itself  produce  about  a 
2-year  lag  of prices  behind  money,  and,  second,  the dependence  of money 
demand  on  lagged  values  of temporary  income,  which  lengthens  the  lag 
to  the  2-  to 4-year  range. 
20  This  calculation  does  not  terminate  with  the  DMR_  5 value  but,  rather,  includes  the 
full  distributed  lag  implied  by  the  form  of  eq.  (12). 
21  Similarly  long  lags  in  the  impact  of  (actual)  money  movements  on  the  price  level 
have  been  noted  by  Selden  (1976,  p.  5)  and  Gordon  (1975,  p.  647). 
22  Hence  Gordon's  criterion  (1975,  p.  615),  "Is  the  effect  of  money  on  prices  instan- 
taneous,  as required  by  the  rational-expectations  literature,  or  does  it operate  with  a long 
lag  ?"  does  not  make  sense.  The  effect  of anticipated  money  movements  on  the  price  level 
can  be virtually  instantaneous  at  the  same  time  that  unanticipated  movements  (and  hence 
actual  movements  of  money  in  a  reduced  form  that  holds  fixed  the  predictors  of  money 
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Pre-1948 observations  and  the  residual  effect  of wartime  price  controls.-The hy- 
pothesis  that price level observations  from  the immediate post-World War II 
period are generated from the same model that generated the observations 
from 1948 to  1976 can be decisively rejected. For example, for the case 
where the coefficient of log(M,)  is constrained to equal one and the MIL 
variable is excluded  (changes in  these features are unimportant in  the 
present context),  the test statistic for including the 1946-47 observations 
in equation (9) is F'9  =  55.5, 5 percent critical value  =  3.5; while that 
for the 1945-47 observations is F39  =  83.2, 5 percent critical value  =  3.1. 
An  extrapolation of  the  price level  estimates from equation  (9)  to the 
1945-47 years (table 2, cols. 2, 3) shows that the equation overestimates 
the reported price level by about 7.5 percent in 1947, 19 percent in 1946, 
and 42 percent in 1945. 
On the other hand, an output equation of the form of equation (2) can 
satisfactorily encompass the  1945-47  observations. The  test statistics are 
22=  0.2, 5 percent critical value  =  3.4, for the inclusion of the 1946-47 
observations;  and  F2  =  0.9,  5  percent  critical  value  =  3.0,  for  the 
1945-47 observations.  23 
A possible interpretation of the price level and output results  for 1945-47 
is that the controls, which were gradually eased from 1946 on, principally 
affected the reported price level without having real effects on output, the 
economically relevant price level, etc. Under this interpretation, the extrap- 
olation of the post-1948 estimated price equation to the 1945-47 period 
(table  2,  col.  2)  may  provide better estimates than  the  reported price 
indices of the economically relevant price level for these years. According 
to this approach, the reported price increase by 14.5 percent from 1945 to 
1946 would be converted to a price decrease  of 9 percent, the reported price 
increase by  12.5 percent from  1946 to  1947 would  be converted to an 
increase of 1 percent, and the reported price increase by 6.5 percent from 
1947 to 1948 would be converted to a decrease of 0.5 percent. 
Price  controls  in the  post-1948  period.-The  two instances of general price- 
control programs since 1948 are the Korean War controls for 1951-52 and 
the  more recent experiment from August  1971 through roughly  1973. 
(I exclude the wage-price guideposts episode from 1962 to roughly 1966 
as being a priori nonserious, although the within-sample residuals from 
equation [9] are  -  1.1 percent for 1962 and  -0.6  percent for 1963.) The 
within-sample residuals from equation  (9)  (table 2,  col.  3)  for the five 
"control years"24 are  + 1.6 percent for  1951,  +0.1  percent for  1952, 
23  Using  extrapolations  of  the  money-growth  equation  back  to  1937  to  form  the  re- 
quired  DMR  values,  it  appears  that  the  output  equation  is  stable  at  least  back  to  1941. 
The  price  level  equation,  which  substantially  overestimates  the  reported  price  level  for 
1943-44,  appears  to  be  roughly  back  on  track  in  1942.  The  unemployment  rate  equation 
is stable  back  to  1942  hut  substantially  underestimates  the  actual  value  in  1941. 
24  I  have  included  the  1971  observation  with  this  group,  although  it  could  be  argued 
that  this  observation  is affected  by  expectations  of  controls  prior  to  August,  which  might 
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+ 1.3 percent for 1971, +0.3  percent for 1972, and 0.0 percent for 1973. 
More interestingly for the present purpose, if an extrapolation to the 5 
control years is made from a relation of the form of equation  (9) that is 
estimated only over the "noncontrol years," 1948-50,  1953-70, and 1974- 
76, the residuals are +3.9  percent for 1951, + 1.9 percent for 1952, + 1.2 
percent for  1971,  -0.3  percent for  1972, and  -1.3  percent for  1973. 
A  similar pattern of  residuals obtains  if the  extrapolation  is from the 
1948-50,  1953-70  sample.  An  extrapolation  from the  1948-70  sample 
yields the residuals:  +2.8  percent for 1971,  +0.7  percent for 1972, and 
0.0 percent for 1973. Hence there is no indication from these calculations 
of a downward effect of controls on the price level. 
Considering the pattern of residuals above, it seems unnecessary to carry 
out a formal F-test of the hypothesis that controls lower the reported price 
level.  (Such a test is carried out in an earlier version of this paper: Barro 
1977b.) However,  it  is worth noting  two  difficulties with  price-control 
analyses that are based either on extrapolated residuals or on an F-test 
for a shift in the parameters of a price equation.  (See Oi  1976 for some 
additional issues in this context.) First, the extent and probability of con- 
trols is unlikely to be exogenous with respect to shifts in the price equation. 
(This interconnection might explain the apparently strong, perverse effect 
of controls during the Korean War, although the large wartime increase 
in the G/y variable is already held constant in the price equation.) If con- 
trols are an indicator of a positive shift in the price equation,  then the 
tests would be biased toward rejecting the hypothesis that controls lower 
the price level. Second, the present type of test neglects the possible impact 
of controls on the right-hand variables of the price equation. The present 
analysis would reveal only the effects of controls for given values of the 
explanatory variables. In  particular, it  would  be worth examining  the 
possible effect of controls on the interest rate, although that investigation 
will  require an extension of the analysis to interest-rate determination. 
Despite these caveats, it is difficult to see how the post-1948 experience can 
be  used  to argue  that  controls  significantly  depress  the  price  level,25  even 
if one  abstracts  from  the distinction  between  the reported  and  actual  price 
levels  during  a controls  period. 
Post-1974  behavior  of money  demand.  It  is worth  examining  whether  the 
estimated-price  equation  shows  any  indication  of  the  post-1974  break- 
down  in the  money-demand  function  that  has been  noted  by  Enzler  et al. 
(1976),  Goldfeld  (1976),  and  others.  The  within-sample  residuals  from 
equation  (9)  (table  3,  col.  2)  for  1974-76  are  -0.3,  +0.9,  and  -0.2 
percent,  respectively.  If a relation  of the form of equation  (9)  is fitted  only 
25  This  conclusion  seems  to  agree  with  that  reached  by  Feige  and  Pearce  (1976,  p.  295) 
and  to  conflict  with  results  obtained  by  Gordon  (1975,  p.  640).  However,  it  is difficult  to 
make  a  satisfactory  comparison  with  Gordon's  results,  because  his  measurement  of  the 
price  level  by  the  private  deflator  exclusive  of  food  and  energy  components  involves  a 
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through  1973,  the  extrapolated  residuals  for  1974-76  are  0.0,  +  1.5,  and 
+0.3  percent,  respectively.  A  test  for  unchanged  structure  for  1974-76 
yields  the  statistic  F16  =  0.8,  which  is well  below  the  5  percent  critical 
value  of 3.2.  Hence  the results do not support  the hypothesis  of a structural 
break  in  money  demand  after  1974.  This  conclusion  is  in  accord  with 
recent  money-demand  estimates  reported  by  Hamburger  (1977).  The 
difference  in  Hamburger's  and  my  results  from  those  in the  studies  above 
may  derive  from  the  use  of a long-term  rather  than  a short-term  interest 
rate.  At  a  theoretical  level,  the  long-term  interest  rate  could  be  more 
pertinent  than  the  short-term  rate  to  money  demand  even  if  short-term 
assets  were  the  closer  substitute  for  money.  Since  the  long  rate  would 
represent  a  weighted  average  of  anticipated  future  short  rates,  it  would 
affect  current  money  demand  if  there  were  lump-sum,  investment-type 
costs  associated  with  changing  average  holdings  of cash  through  changes 
in  the  timing  of transactions  shifts  to new  types  of assets,  etc. 
IV.  Predictions 
Predictions  for  1977 onward  of money  growth,  output,  and  the  price  level 
(and  the  rate  of  inflation)  are  contained  in  tables  1 and  2.  The  money- 
growth-rate  predictions  assume  that  federal  expenditure  relative  to  nor- 
mal,  FEDV,  remains  at its 1976 level26  and that unemployment  rates from 
1977  on  correspond  to  the  predictions  from  an  updating  of  my  earlier 
study  (Barro  1977a,  p.  102).  The  predicted  values  for money  growth  (table 
1, col.  2)  are  5.8  percent  for  1977  and  6.7  percent  for  1978,  rising  from 
there  to a long-run  predicted  value  of 7.0 percent  per year.  This  high  long- 
run prediction  for the money-growth  rate reflects the response  of DM  to the 
lagged  unemployment  rate  (eq.  [1]  above),  combined  with  an estimate  of 
the  current  and  future  "natural"  unemployment  rate  in  the  vicinity  of 
6.5 percent.  Even if this unemployment-rate  estimate  is correct,  the response 
of money  growth  in  the  circumstance  of a  permanently  high  level  of  the 
unemployment  rate  may  not  conform  to the  countercyclical  response  that 
was estimated  in equation  (1)  over  a sample  period  where  the natural  rate 
was,  in  the  main,  much  lower  than  6.5  percent.  Although  presently  I do 
not  have  a better  procedure  for forecasting  money  growth,  it is important 
to recognize  that  inflation-rate  forecasts  are sensitive  to these  forecasts  for 
money  growth.  (However,  the  output  predictions,  which  are  based  on 
DMR  values,  are  not  sensitive  in  the  same  way  to  the  money-growth 
projections.) 
With  respect  to  output  predictions  (table  1, col.  5),  note  first  that  the 
26  Since the FEDV  variable has not been normalized  to make its average value equal 
to zero in the context  of secular growth of the public sector, this value  for FED V (0.18) 
is  positive.  Normalization  of  the FEDV  variable  would  affect  none  of  the  substantive 
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1976 value of actual output relative to trend, log (y), is -5.4  percent,  as 
compared  with  an  estimated  value  of  -  6.5  percent.  For  the  forecast 
period (assuming that the values of the MIL variable and all future DMRs 
are equal to zero), the predictions for output relative to trend implied by 
the  estimated equation  (3),  which  are labeled A  in  table  1, are  -  5.6 
percent for  1977,  -4.2  percent for  1978,  -3.5  percent for  1979, and 
-3.2  percent for 1980 onward.  (The  negative estimate of the long-run 
value for log [y1 is implied by the assumed zero value for the military 
variable,  in  contrast  to  the  positive  value  of  this  variable  that  prevailed 
over most of the sample  period.)  Predictions  based  on the jointly  estimated 
coefficients  that  are shown  in equation  (13),  which  are labeled  B in table 
1, are  basically  similar.  The  prediction  pattern  reflects  the  gradual  decay 
in  influence  of the  contractionary  monetary  behavior  (negative  values  of 
DMR)  from  1974-76.  In  terms  of forecasts  for growth  rates  of real  GNP, 
the  implied  values  based  on  equation  (3)  are  3.4  percent  for  1977  (using 
the  actual  value  of  1976 output  as a base)-which  is just  under  the  trend 
rate  of growth  4.9  percent  for  1978,  4.3  percent  for  1979,  3.8  percent  for 
1980,  and  3.5  percent  the  estimated  trend  rate  of growth--for  1981 and 
beyond. 
Two  sets of price  level  and  inflation-rate  predictions  are shown  in table 
2.  Projection  A  uses  the  coefficients  from  the  estimated  price  equation 
(9),  while  projection  B utilizes  the jointly  estimated  coefficients  that  are 
shown  in  equation  (13).  Both  projections  assume  that  the  G/y  and  r vari- 
ables  remain  at  their  1976  levels  and  that  values  of DMR  from  1977  on 
are  equal  to zero.  The  largest  difference  in  the  two  projections  occurs  for 
the  1977 forecast  projection  A implies  a 7.3 percent  inflation  rate,  while 
projection  B yields  only  a  6.3  percent  rate.  Both  projections  show  some 
tapering  off  of inflation  to  1980-to  just  above  4  percent  per  year  in  the 
first  case  and  just  below  5  percent  per  year  in  the  second.  Finally,  both 
projections  imply  some  increase  in the inflation  rate after  1980-to  a long- 
run value  of 5.9  percent  per year  in the  first case and  6.1  percent  per year 
in  the  second.  These  long-run  values  are implied  by  the  long-run  predic- 
tion  for money  growth  of 7.0  percent  per year,  together  with  an estimated 
time  trend  in  the  price  equation  of  -  1.1  and  -0.9  percent  per  year, 
respectively. 
V.  A  Simulated  "Phillips  Curve" 
The  present  results  on  money  growth,  output,  and  the  price  level  and  the 
earlier  results  on  the  unemployment  rate  can  be  combined  to  describe 
some  aspects  of  the  dynamics  of  economic  response  to  monetary  distur- 
bances.  This  description  amounts  to tracing  out  a dynamic  Phillips  curve 
in  which  temporary  movements  of  output  and  the  unemployment  rate 
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level and inflation rate from their normal values. The main features of this 
analysis can be illustrated from an exercise in which  there is an initial 
"steady state" (produced, say, by a long series of zero DMR values) that 
is  disturbed in  year  0  by  a  positive  money  shock, say,  DMR  =  0.01. 
Subsequent money shocks are assumed to be absent (i.e., DMR  =  0 for 
year 1 onward) and changes in other "exogenous" variables such as r,27 
MIL,  and  G/y  are  also  not  considered. 
The behavior of money growth is assumed to be described by equation 
(1) and that of output and the price level by the jointly estimated coeffi- 
cients shown in equation  (13). The  unemployment rate (which enters in 
the determination of anticipated values of DM  in eq. [1]) is based on an 
updated  form of the  equation  from my  earlier study  (Barro 1977a, p. 
108).28  Table 4 indicates the resulting time pattern of estimated values 
for DM,  log (M),  U, log (y),  Dy (the growth rate of output), log (P), DP 
(the inflation rate), log (y)  +  log (P)  (nominal GNP), and Dy +  DP (the 
growth rate of nominal GNP)  all expressed as deviations from normal 
or trend values. 
The positive money shock in year 0 produces an expansion that is con- 
centrated in years 0-2 in terms of a higher level of output and a lower rate 
of unemployment and in year 0 in terms of a higher growth rate of output. 
The level of output is most of the way back toward normal by year 3 and 
completely back by year 4. By implication, the growth rate of output is 
below normal in years 2-4.  The unemployment rate is back to its natural 
value by year 3. 
The price level, which is raised slightly above its normal trend in year 0, 
actually falls below this trend for years  1 and 2. The  price level moves 
above trend in year 3 and strongly above trend in years 4-6.  Correspond- 
ingly, the inflation rate is above normal in year 0, well below normal in 
year 1, about normal in year 2, and well above normal in years 3-5. In the 
present example, the price level remains permanently above trend (corre- 
sponding to the permanent shift above trend in the money stock), but the 
inflation rate returns asymptotically to its normal value. 
The last two columns of table 4 indicate the implications of the output 
and  price level  paths for the  level  and  growth rate of nominal  GNP. 
Nominal GNP rises strongly along with real GNP in year 0 but declines 
in years 1-3. Nominal GNP grows from year 4 on along with the increases 
in the price level. 
The simulation illustrates the sense in which a temporary economic high 
27  Clearly, endogenous movements of the nominal interest rate could be occurring, al- 
though  the use of a long-term  (Aaa corporate bond)  rate makes the assumed constancy 
of r more plausible  in the present example. 
28  The  pattern of DMR  coefficients in this equation  is  -  6.5DMR,  -  11.7DMR,1  - 
5.5DMR,.  2.  The  estimated  natural  unemployment  rate for  1976 from this equation  is 
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(principally in years 0-2)  produced by an unanticipated  monetary expansion 
is associated with a delayed  (from year 3 on) temporary increase in the 
inflation rate and a somewhat further delayed (especially from year 4 on) 
but permanent increase above trend in the price level. 
It  is not appropriate to view  the type of dynamic interplay between 
output and prices that is described in table 4 as a menu for a policy trade- 
off. Some fallacies in this view have been pointed out in Lucas (1972), 
Sargent and Wallace  (1975),  Barro (1976),  et al. At  the risk of repeti- 
tion, a principal point is that the monetary stimulus assumed in table 4 
must be unanticipated, so that perceived changes in systematic policy- 
for example, shifts in the extent of feedback from the unemployment rate 
or other variables to the money-growth rate  would not produce the out- 
put and unemployment-rate responses that are shown in the simulation. 
A different viewpoint, exemplified by Taylor  (1975), is that unantici- 
pated monetary changes can be engineered by the monetary authority in 
a  systematic,  presumably  countercyclical  manner.  29  This  approach 
assumes, first, that individuals do not appreciate that the monetary author- 
ity is pursuing a policy of systematic deception (which could produce an 
unstable situation)  and,  second,  that  the private sector is in a reactive 
position vis-a-vis an activist, independent policymaker. Under these two 
conditions, the private sector is naturally viewed as adapting its expecta- 
tions gradually (perhaps along Bayesian lines) to shifts in policy. An alter- 
native perspective on policy is that it reflects the views of the private sector, 
as channeled through the political process, with respect to such basic issues 
as being on or off the gold standard, whether or not to establish a central 
monetary authority like the Federal Reserve, whether to pursue a "Full 
Employment Act" economic policy or a steady money-growth policy, etc. 
In this view the basic structure of monetary determination is likely to be 
stable over long periods (as I believe is true as a good approximation in 
the United States for the post-World War II period and is probably also 
true for the gold standard period from 1880 to 1914), although the process 
would be subject to infrequent, discrete changes. Examples of such changes 
for the United  States would seem to be the return to gold in  1879, the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve in  1914, the changes in the role of 
gold during World War I and in 1933, and the passage of the Full Employ- 
ment Act in 1946. It remains to be seen whether the recent heightening of 
attention to the amount and stability of the money-growth rate will pro- 
29  If  unanticipated  monetary  changes  can  in  fact  be  generated  systematically  through 
deceptive  policy,  it is unclear  how  such  a policy  could  improve  the  performance  of  a well- 
functioning  private  economy.  Clearly,  some  type  of  externality  or  transaction-cost  argu- 
ment  would  have  to  be  invoked.  The  more  likely  outcome  of  unpredictable  monetary 
policy  is  that  it  would  exacerbate  the  information  problems  faced  by  private  agents,  as 
discussed  in  Barro  (1976,  sec.  3).  In  any  case,  a convincing  normative  theory  of deceptive 
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duce another change in basic policy. In any event, if these types of policy 
changes themselves reflect the workings of the political process or develop- 
ments in  the domestic or international economy,  there is no  reason to 
believe that the (average) expectation of changes in policy structure would 
lag behind the actual changes. Although a period surrounding a discrete 
change in policy structure might be marked by substantial uncertainty and 
difference of opinion, it seems just as likely that the average expectation 
would lead, rather than lag, the actual changes in policy. 
VI.  Extensions  of the  Research 
The  extension  of  the  anticipated/unanticipated  money  concept  to  the 
determination of the price level fills an important gap in my earlier em- 
pirical analysis. Although  the results on  price level determination seem 
basically favorable to the approach, there are numerous issues that warrant 
further attention. 
The analysis brings out the role of the nominal interest rate in the deter- 
mination of the price level. The research could be usefully extended to an 
explanation of the relation of interest rates to monetary and other vari- 
ables. I am currently working on a theoretical investigation that relates the 
anticipated/unanticipated money viewpoint to interest-rate  determination. 
This theoretical work will eventually be implemented empirically. 
It would be important to extend the results obtained from recent obser- 
vations in  the  United  States to  the  longer time-series experience. This 
extension is both difficult and potentially fruitful, because it requires an 
explicit treatment of the types of substantial structural shifts in the money 
growth process (movements on or off the gold standard, establishment of 
the Federal Reserve, etc.)  that were discussed in Part V above. The per- 
formance of the approach in this environment will be a major test of the 
usefulness of the anticipated/unanticipated money concept. 
Finally, the present analysis does not detail the mechanism by which 
unanticipated movements in money affect real variables like output and 
unemployment. The precise channels are likely to involve unanticipated 
movements in the price level, which are the focus of theoretical models 
developed by Lucas (1973), Barro (1976), et al. However, the contempo- 
raneous response of the GNP deflator to monetary shocks that has been 
isolated in the present empirical study may be too weak to provide the 
principal link between money and output. An extension of the analysis to 
additional "price" variables like the nominal wage and the wholesale price 
index and a consideration of producers' inventories may be important in 
clarifying the  process by  which  monetary shocks translate into  output 
responses. The analysis of interest rates, as discussed above, may also be 
important in this context. 580  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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